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1 Introduction
In a contest situation agents compete for a prize or a rent by making irretrievable
outlays or eﬀorts. The set of competitors is usually taken as fixed and a variety of
design variations have been considered that aﬀect the amount of eﬀort supplied by
contestants and their consequent expected profits. Examples are the structure of
prizes (Clark and Riis, 1998; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), the order of moves and
commitment (Dixit, 1987; Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992), the form of the con-
test success function (Hirshleifer, 1989; Nti, 2004; Amegashie, 2006), rent-sharing
arrangements (Long and Vousden, 1987; Nitzan, 1991) and multiple rounds (Grad-
stein and Konrad, 1999).1 Whilst the focus in these papers is how a designer (outside
of the contest) can aﬀect the outcomes and eﬀorts of the participants, we consider
a situation in which one of the participants can act in order to aﬀect the contest
arena. Specifically, we look at the case in which one firm has a smaller cost of mak-
ing eﬀort in the contest than rivals. Instead of taking this situation for granted, the
low-cost firm can wholly or partially donate the source of its advantage to a subset
of rivals with the intention of driving non-recipients from the market. In a lobbying
application for example, the superior lobby may have the better contacts and can
oﬀer some of these to rivals; if the contest describes a patent race then the labora-
tory that is most eﬃcient may loan out some of its researchers, or disclose some of
its techniques. By doing this, the hope is that the remaining inferior competitors
may pull out of the contest completely. Here there is a trade oﬀ since the superior
firm reduces the number of rivals, which increases its own profit, but the remaining
competitors are more eﬃcient and this would drive profit down.
Previously, Baye et al (1993) have looked at the possible benefits to excluding
some competitors in an all-pay auction; they noted that a player with more to gain
from winning than other competitors can eﬀectively "scare oﬀ" competitors, making
it less likely that they will submit a positive bid. These authors presented conditions
under which a contest designer can increase the expected total bid in the all-pay
auction by excluding the strongest competitors. On a similar note, Amegashie (1999,
1This is by no means and exhaustive list of design possibilities nor the attached literature. The
interested reader is referred to Congleton et al. (2008) and Konrad (2007).
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2000) looks at rent-seeking in a Tullock (1980) contest in which competitors may
have to compete in a preliminary round, or be subjected to shortlisting. He analyses
how contest administrators can then aﬀect the level of rent-seeking through diﬀerent
designs of the preliminary round or the shortlisting process. Our work deviates from
previous papers in this field by not focusing on the exogenous design of contests, but
we analyze the case in which one of the participants attempts to endogenously change
the rules of the game. Specifically, we allow the firm that has the cost advantage
in the rent seeking activity to "license" its advantage to a sub-set of the other,
ex ante identical, firms.2 We refer to this generally as a transfer of "rent-seeking
technology", and give examples of this activity at the end of the general analysis.
After the transfer of rent-seeking technology, there is competition according to a
Tullock contest model where firms compete for a prize of exogenously given value.3
The main message from the paper is that foreclosure of a subset of firms may
be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. To transfer the
cost reduction to a subset of rivals may be used as a tool to foreclose the non-license
takers from the market. We demonstrate first that a firm that has a large advantage
over its rivals will prefer to "go it alone", and not transfer its rent-seeking technology
to others. When the initial cost advantage is smaller, the dominant firm will only
make a transfer of its cost advantage if it can be used to foreclose some rival firms.
The reason for this is that active outsiders (i.e. firms that do not obtain licenses)
are a drain on the insiders’ profit. Licensing only occurs if the licensor is able to
foreclose all rival firms but the licensees, and trades are more likely the larger the
number of players at the outset.
To check the robustness of the results, we open for the possibility that the su-
perior firm can transfer an intermediate cost advantage to rivals (i.e. reducing the
marginal cost of the contest activity to licensees, but still keeping it above that of
the dominant actor). It turns out that the motive to foreclose is so strong that the
superior firm would prefer to grant the greatest cost reduction possible since this
2Although we refer to this as licensing, we place no restrictions on the form of payment that
may be made for access to the cost advantage in rent seeking.
3Huck et al. (2002) come closest to our focus on endogenizing the number of competitors in
considering merger between rivals in a contest.
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also forecloses as many rivals as possible.
Section 2 analyses the case in which only the only the whole cost reduction can
be transferred, and Section 3 looks at the transfer of an intermediate cost reduc-
tion. Section 4 discusses the findings, and presents policy implications in diﬀerent
applications of the analysis.
2 The model
There are n+1 firms that compete for a prize of value V by making a sunk investment
of some kind. Let firm 0 have a marginal cost of investment equal to 1. All other
firms j = {1, .., n} have a marginal cost c > 1. This cost diﬀerence can be thought
of as diﬀerences in rent-seeking technology. Investments are denoted by bx0 and bxj
and are irretrievable. The probability (p) that a firm wins is equal to its investment
relative to the sum of investments:
p0 =
bx0bx0 +Pns=1 bxs (1)
pj =
bxjbx0 +Pns=1 bxs , j = {1, .., n}
This formulation has been often used in the contest literature, following the
seminal work by Tullock (1980)4.
2.1 Benchmark case
When each firm uses its initial rent-seeking technology with the marginal costs
outlined above, the expected payoﬀs are given by
4For many contest type applications of this function see Konrad (2007).
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bπ0 = bx0Vbx0 +Pns=1 bxs − bx0bπj = bxjVbx0 +Pns=1 bxs − cbxj, j = {1, ..., n}
First-order conditions defining an interior maximum for bx0 and bxj are given by
Pn
s=1 bxsV
(bx0 +Pns=1 bxs)2 − 1 = 0bx0 +Ps6=j bxsV
(bx0 +Pns=1 bxs)2 − c = 0, j = {1, ..., n}
Equilibrium investments and expected payoﬀs are then easily verified to be
bx∗0 = V n(n(c− 1) + 1)(cn+ 1)2
bx∗j = V n(cn+ 1)2 , j = {1, ..., n}
bπ∗0 = (n(c− 1) + 1)2V(cn+ 1)2 = bx∗0(c− 1 + 1n) (2)
bπ∗j = V(cn+ 1)2 = bx∗jn , j = {1, ..., n} (3)
W ≡ bπ∗0 + nbπ∗j = (n(c− 1) + 1)2V(cn+ 1)2 + n V(cn+ 1)2
where W is total welfare. The form of bπ∗0 emphasizes the two sources of profit that
firm 0 has in this model; profit increases the larger the cost advantage that firm 0
has compared to others (∂eπ
∗
0
∂c > 0), and the lower the number of rivals that compete
for the prize (∂eπ
∗
0
∂n < 0).
2.2 Transfer of rent seeking technology
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Suppose now that firm 0 can license its rent-seeking technology to k ≤ n of the
other firms for a price of t. Hence, with licensing we have k+1 firms with marginal
cost of rent-seeking equal to 1, and n − k with marginal cost c. Denote the set of
the k ex ante outsiders with access to the superior rent-seeking technology by set
T and the n − k without as set NT . We assume that there are no restrictions on
the licensing schemes. Although the price t can be both positive and negative, the
licensees in the present model will benefit from the reduction in marginal cost of
participating in the contest and are therefore prepared to pay a positive price t > 0.
The expected payoﬀs of firm 0, j ∈ T, and i ∈ NT are then given by
π0 =
x0V
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
− x0 + kt
πj =
xjV
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
− xj − t, j ∈ T (4)
πi =
xiV
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
− cxi, i ∈ NT
An interior equilibrium for investments is characterized by the following first-
order conditions:
∂π0
∂x0
=
¡P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − 1 = 0
∂πj
∂xj
=
³
x0 +
P
s 6=j∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − 1 = 0, j ∈ T (5)
∂πi
∂xi
=
³
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v 6=i∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − c = 0, i ∈ NT
The problems that player 0 and each member of T have to solve are identical, as
is the maximization problem for each i ∈ NT . Posit then that x0 = xj ≡ x ∀ j ∈ T
and xi ≡ y ∀ i ∈ NT . Then (5) can be rewritten as
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(kx+ (n− k)y)V
((k + 1)x+ (n− k)y)2
− 1 = 0 (6)
((k + 1)x+ (n− k − 1)y)V
((k + 1)x+ (n− k)y)2
− c = 0, i ∈ NT
From these two equations, the following relative relationship between x and y
emerges:
x =
(n− k)(c− 1) + 1
1 + k(1− c) y (7)
The numerator in (7) is always positive and the denominator is positive for
1
c− 1 > k (8)
Since an equilibrium involving some transfer of rent-seeking technology in which
all n firms are active has k ≥ 1 we can state the following result immediately.
Proposition 1 There is no interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium involving the
transfer of rent-seeking technology for c > 2, given that all firms are active.
When the rivals are at a strong disadvantage (c > 2) it does not pay for the
eﬃcient firm to allow others to become more eﬃcient whilst at the same time having
some players participating that do not pay a licensing fee to firm 0.
2.2.1 Transfer without foreclosure
Suppose now that (8) is fulfilled, i.e., c ∈ (1, 2], so that all firms have positive
investment in equilibrium irrespective of their type of rent-seeking technology; we
proceed to characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Using (7) in (6) gives
the following equilibrium investments:
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x∗ =
V n((n− k)(c− 1) + 1)
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
(9)
y∗ =
V n(1 + k(1− c))
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
Inserting (9) into (4) gives the equilibrium expected payoﬀs as
π∗0(n, k) =
V ((n− k)(c− 1) + 1)2
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
+ tk
π∗j(n, k) =
V ((n− k)(c− 1) + 1)2
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
− t, j ∈ T (10)
π∗i (n, k) =
V ((k(c− 1)− 1)2
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
, i ∈ NT
Licensing of the more eﬃcient rent-seeking technology is profitable for 0 if π∗0 ≥bπ∗0, and those who are oﬀered the new technology wish to buy as long as π∗j ≥ bπ∗j
from (3).
A licensing agreements is feasible if it is in the interest of both the licensor and
the licensees. In order to look at the feasibility of licensing agreements, consider the
payoﬀ of the group of "insiders", i.e. firms that have the best rent-seeking technology
consisting of firm 0 and j ∈ T . The aggregate profit of this group increases after
technology transfer if
π∗0(n, k) + kπ
∗
j(n, k) > bπ∗0 + kbπ∗j (11)
since the licensing fee is just an internal transfer within the group. Without
considering the licensing fee, it is easy to verify that 0 gets a lower payoﬀ following
transfer of the rent-seeking technology, and the other insiders experience an increase.
The licensor will not accept to share its cost advantage without side payment, and
the licensees are willing to pay a positive price for access to the better rent-seeking
technology, which implies that feasibility requires a transfer to the licensor.
If (11) is satisfied, it is possible to compensate firm 0 adequately for the reduction
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in expected payoﬀ. Using (10), (2) and (3), (11) is satisfied as long as
n ≥ k > 2 (cn+ 1) (−n+ cn+ 1)
(c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) (12)
A necessary condition for this to hold is that the interval is defined, i.e.
n− 2 (cn+ 1) (−n+ cn+ 1)
(c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) > 0⇒
−(n2(c− 1) + 2(1 + cn))
(c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) > 0
which clearly cannot hold since (n2(c−1)+2(1+cn)) > 0 and (c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) >
0 since c > 1.
Hence we see that (12) cannot be satisfied. This means that by selling licences
to k firms, while the remaining n− k firms are still active in the market, leads to a
reduction in the total profit of the insiders. Hence, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 There is no feasible licensing agreement involving the transfer of
the superior rent-seeking technology to k firms given that the n− k firms are active.
This result implies that a motive for transferring the rent-seeking technology to
others may be foreclosure of non-recipients, a case to with we now turn.
2.2.2 Transfer with foreclosure
Allowing non-license takers to remain active is a drain on the profits of the insider
group. Assume then that k is set so that y∗ = 0, i.e.
n > k ≥ 1
c− 1 (13)
Note that there are now only k + 1 players in total (0 and the k licensees).
This means that the expressions in (9) have to be adjusted accordingly by setting
y∗ = 0 and n = k in x∗ so that the amount of investment in the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is:
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xf =
k
(1 + k)2
V
with expected total payoﬀs to the group of k + 1 insiders
Πf =
V
k + 1
(14)
with each insider earning πf = V
(k+1)2
− t and firm 0 earning πf0 = V(k+1)2 + tk.
Given that (13) is fulfilled, trade of licenses either at a positive or negative price is
now feasible if total payoﬀs to the insiders (firm 0 and the k licensees) are higher
with than without license transfer:
∆Π = Πf −
¡bπ∗0 + kbπ∗j¢ ≥ 0 (15)
Feasibility of trade in licenses at a positive price requires that πf > bπ∗j for each
of the k insider firms, which is always satisfied since cn > k.
Given that ∆Π ≥ 0, firm 0 will choose the number of licenses, k, to make Πf
as large as possible in relation to the outside option of the licensees (kbπ∗j). This
would imply that the total value added of licensing with foreclosure is maximized.
Without any restrictions on the price structure or price level, a transfer payment
between the licensees and the licensor can be set up to allow the licensor to capture
the value added. Hence, firm 0 sets k that maximizes the following
Πf0 = Π
f − kbπ∗j = V(k + 1) − k V(cn+ 1)2 (16)
Since Πf0 is decreasing in k, the lowest value of this parameter will be chosen,
given that the foreclosure condition in (13) holds. Hence, firm 0 will set kf = 1c−1
to achieve foreclosure of the n − k firms. Inserting kf into (15), trade is feasible,
(∆Π ≥ 0), as long as
n2c(c− 1)2 + 1− 2c > 0 (17)
We need also that n > kf = 1c−1 . It is easily verified that this is true when (17)
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is satisfied. From (17) we see that trades are more likely to be feasible the larger is
n. Solving (17) delineates feasible trades, and we define nf as the critical level of n
that ensures feasible trades:
n > nf =
s
2c− 1
c(c− 1)2 (18)
Consequently, the larger is the number of potential firms, n, the more likely is
the feasibility of trade in licenses. It is straightforward to show that the critical
level of nf is lower the higher is the marginal cost of eﬀort for the outsiders, since
∂nf/∂c < 0 for c ∈ (1, 2]
∂nf
∂c
= − (4c
2 − 3c+ 1)
2c2(c− 1)3
q
2c−1
c(c−1)2
< 0
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
c
n, k
Figure 1: Foreclosure level kf and the feasibility requirement nf : nf (whole line),
kf (dashed line) for n ≥ 2
For the sake of the argument, we concentrate on n ≥ 2, so that at least one firm
will be foreclosed. When c approaches 2, nf approaches 1
2
√
6 < 2, such that trades
will always be feasible. From (18) we find that nf = 2 if c ≈ 1. 59. Consequently, if
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c ∈ (1. 59, 2], trade is feasible for all n ≥ 2. In contrast, when c approaches 1, trades
will not be feasible.
We thus state the following result:
Proposition 3 Licensing to k firms in order to foreclose the n− k firms from the
contest increases the total expected payoﬀs to the insiders as long as n > nf , where
nf is decreasing in c.
While trades are feasible when (15) is fulfilled, the condition that ensures that
trade increases welfare is given by
∆W = Πf −
¡bπ∗0 + nbπ∗j¢ ≥ 0 (19)
Since n > k, as long as n > nf , it follows that ∆W ≥ 0 is a stronger condition
than ∆Π ≥ 0. Thus, the set of outcomes that involves feasibility of licensing is
larger than the set of outcomes that is socially desirable. We insert for kf into (14),
and total expected payoﬀs to the insiders in the foreclosure case becomes:
Πf(kf) =
V (c− 1)
c
The condition that ensures that foreclosure increases welfare (19) may then be
rewritten as
∆W =
V (c− 1)
c
−
µ
V (n2 (c2 − 2c+ 1) + n (2c− 1) + 1)
(cn+ 1)2
¶
=
V (c2n2 − cn2 − cn− 1)
(cn+ 1)2 c
≥ 0
It is easily verified that ∆W is an increasing function of n. Hence we can define nw
as the critical level of n that ensures that welfare increases:
nw ≡ 1
2c (c− 1)
³
c+
p
c (5c− 4)
´
with welfare increasing for n > nw.
Comparing the two critical levels of n, nf and nw, we first of all observe that
nw is strictly larger than nf for all permissible parameter values. This implies that
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there are combinations of (n, c) such that license trading is feasible (with n > nf),
but where such trade is detrimental to welfare (with n < nw). This is the area
between the solid and dashed line in the figure below. As we observe from the fig-
ure, the area exists albeit not for a substantial set of parameter values. For most
of the combinations of the parameters (n, c), feasible trade would also be welfare
enhancing.
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
c
n
Figure 2: Feasible versus welfare enhancing trade (nw dashed line, nf whole line),
n ≥ 2
We also need to check that n > kf ≡ 1c−1 , or since nw > nf that n > max
©
kf , nf
ª
which is trivially satisfied for c > 1:
nf − kf =
s
2c− 1
c(c− 1)2 −
1
c− 1
=
1
(c− 1)
Ãr
2c− 1
c
− 1
!
> 0 for c ∈ (1, 2]
It is straightforward to show ∂∆W/∂c > 0 and ∂∆W/∂n > 0 for c ∈ (1, 2].
Hence welfare will increase most the more disadvantaged the rivals to 0, and the
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larger their initial number. Moreover, we have that ∆W > 0 when c approaches 2,
while ∆W < 0 when c approaches 1.
3 Partial transfer or rent-seeking technology
To check the robustness of the results of the previous section, we now consider
whether firm 0may benefit from transferring a rent-seeking technology that is better
than rivals have at the outset but that is not as eﬃcient as the one used by firm 0.
One may interpret this as transferring a rent-seeking technology of an intermediate
quality, where quality becomes a choice variable for firm 0. Let us assume that k
firms are allowed to acquire the rent-seeking technology that gives a marginal cost
of investment of a, where a ∈ [1, c], and n− k still have the original marginal cost
c. The first-order conditions are now given by:
∂π0
∂x0
=
¡P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − 1 = 0
∂πj
∂xj
=
³
x0 +
P
s 6=j∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − a = 0, j ∈ T (20)
∂πi
∂xi
=
³
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v 6=i∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − c = 0, i ∈ NT
Then we have the following equilibrium investments for each firm type (0, T ,
NT ):
x0(a) =
(cn− ck − n+ ka+ 1)V n
(cn− ck + ka+ 1)2
xT (a) =
(cn− ck + ka− na+ 1)V n
(cn− ck + ka+ 1)2
(21)
xNT (a) =
(k (a− c) + 1)V n
(cn− ck + ka+ 1)2
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From xNT we have that if k ≥ 1c−a , then n − k are driven out of the contest.
Bearing in mind that outsiders just drain resources away from firm 0 and its potential
licensees, let us assume that this is the case, so that the investment levels in (21)
have to be rewritten for the fact that the number of competitors to firm 0 is k = n.
Hence equilibrium investments are
xf0(a) =
(1 + k(a− 1)) k
(1 + ka)2
V
xfT (a) =
k
(1 + ka)2
V
with corresponding expected payoﬀs:
πf0(a) = V
(k(a− 1) + 1)2
(ka+ 1)2
πfT (a) = V
k(a− 1) + 1
(ka+ 1)2
The aggregate payoﬀ of active firms is then
Πf(a) = πf0(a) + kπ
f
T (a) = V
k(a− 1) + 1
ka+ 1
which is strictly increasing in a and strictly decreasing in k. The maximum that
firm 0 can increase its payoﬀ compared to the outset will be the excess of aggregate
payoﬀs over the k insiders’ outside options given by V
(cn+1)2 (from (3)). Then, firm
0 maximizes Πf0(a) = Πf(a)− k V(cn+1)2 by choice of k and a. The level of k will be
set as low as possible, or a as large as possible. However a = c does not represent
a transfer of technology so we consider setting k at the lowest level commensurate
with foreclosure: denote this by kf(a) = 1c−a . Inserting k
f(a) into Πf(a) gives
Πf(kf(a)) =
V (c− 1)
c
where πf0(kf(a)) =
V (c−1)2
c2 and π
f
T (k
f(a)) = V (c−1)(c−a)c2
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Total expected payoﬀ of the insiders Πf(kf(a)) is independent of a. Thus, as
long as trades are feasible, welfare is independent of the level of a ∈ [1, c), i.e.
the quality of the transferred rent-seeking technology does not aﬀect total welfare.
However, from Πf0(a) =
V (c−1)
c −k
V
(cn+1)2 we see that firm 0 prefers to set a = 1 since
kf(a > 1) > kf(a = 1).
Proposition 4 Firm 0 will set a as low as possible such that a = 1, giving k = 1c−1 .
The outcome is identical to Proposition 3, and trades will be feasible as long as
n > nf is satisfied.
The dominant firm faces a trade oﬀ in its choice of the quality of the rent-
seeking technology to transfer to rivals. Better quality means stronger competition
from firms that have the new technology, but at the same time it allows foreclosure
of more of the rival firms. The latter eﬀect dominates here.
4 Discussion and applications
A contest model is particularly applicable for analyzing competition between rivals
when prices cannot be used strategically. Non-price competition can take many
forms such as product promotion (pharmaceutical products are a good example here
according to Huck et al., 2002), R&D eﬀort, lobbying expenditures and investment
in quality. For these examples, the transfer of rent-seeking technology that we
have discussed can involve opening marketing channels for competitors, loaning
out some R&D staﬀ to rivals, or giving access to parts of a contact network.5 A
similar situation can arise in industries where some firms own infrastructure that is
either essential or costly to replicate, and where the owners of such infrastructure
may choose to award rival firms access to the infrastructure. In particular, within
diﬀerent types of network industries the question whether an access seeker will be
5In the pharmaceutical industry it is common to acquire technology for development, i.e. tech-
nology that still requires some R&D input to make a marketable product (see Odagiri, 2003). In
the context of our model, a superior firm may transfer its technology, and then recipients must
spend resources to refine it.
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given access to an essential input has attracted a lot of attention from economists
as well as policy-makers.6
For all of these applications, our model underscores the fundamental trade-oﬀ
that is present in deciding whether to license a competitive advantage to rivals in a
contest; this action will foreclose some competitors at the expense of making some
rivals stronger. Since the contest prize is fixed, foreclosure is a prerequisite for the
leading firm to be willing to give up its advantage to others. Indeed, the incentive to
foreclose is so strong that the superior firm would want to transfer the best version
of its rent-seeking technology to others even if an inferior version is available. This
is because making a few other firms as strong as possible also forces out as many
other rivals as possible.
Our results have some parallels to non-tournament models in which price or
quantity are set strategically. Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyze a three-stage R&D
game with two downstream firms, and they show that major innovations will not
be licensed, but that minor innovations may be licensed by equally eﬃcient firms.
Although our set-up is diﬀerent to theirs, we obtain a similar result: to achieve a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium that involves licensing, the diﬀerence between the superior
technology and the technology available to the other firms cannot be too large.
Gallini (1984) considers the use of licensing in the product market as a strategic
device to deter rivals from entering into R&D activity. In the present analysis,
the innovation is already realized and we only consider when and whether licensing
can occur. Rockett (1990) demonstrates how licensing can be used to choose the
competitors ("weak" or "strong"), through changing the rules and conditions of the
post-patent entry game. By licensing to weak competitors, the licensor is able to
enjoy monopoly rent after the patent expires by crowding the market. Yi (1998)
investigates licensing when potential licensees diﬀer in the absorptive capacities, and
finds that it is optimal to license exclusively to the strong rival.7 In our model, all of
the competitors of the superior firm are ex ante homogeneous, but ongoing work is
looking at the case where rivals can be diﬀerent in terms of their rent-seeking costs.
6One recent example is Ordover and Shaﬀer (2007) who discuss whether mobile network oper-
ators will oﬀer access to their networks to firms without own infrastructure.
7See also Yi (1999).
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One policy implication of our analysis involves transfer of intellectual property
rights. Selective or exclusive licensing is an accepted mode of transferring intellec-
tual property rights between firms as outlined by the US Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission in the Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellec-
tual Property from 1995.8 Hence some degree of foreclosure will not be ruled out
a priori by law. On the other hand, to the extent that the transferred technology
guarantees access to an essential input, competition authorities may adopt a policy
of no discrimination. Under the competition laws in the United States and the EU
the essential-facilities doctrine may apply towards dominating firms which control
a bottleneck, and a dominating firm may be obligated to provide access to rivals at
non-discriminatory terms (see e.g. Bergman, 2001). Moreover, in regulated indus-
tries like telecommunications, obligations which require that the incumbent provides
access at non-discriminatory terms are part of the current regulatory regimes both
in the United States and the EU. If such non-discriminatory obligations are present,
welfare-enhancing licensing of technology may be precluded.
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